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Why did Clodius shut the shops? The rhetoric of mobilizing a crowd in the Late Republic* 
 
Abstract: When Publius Clodius ordered Rome’s tabernae to be shut for one of his meetings 
in 58, he was not only trying to gather a crowd by forcing tabernarii onto the street. Shutting 
the shops was a symbolic move alluding to the archaic iustitium and to the actions of Tiberius 
Gracchus. It allowed Clodius to claim both that his meeting was vital to the safety of the res 
publica and that he (and not Cicero) had the support of the entire Roman people, including 
the lowliest. 
 
 
Publius Clodius is almost universally acknowledged as an innovator who found new 
and better ways of taking advantage of the tribunate of the plebs as a position of power.
1
 One 
conventional understanding of his achievement is that he was the first man who successfully 
                                                          
* Some of the following material derives from papers given at Durham in 2012, and at the APA annual meeting 
in Seattle and the Norman Baynes meeting in Stevenage in 2013. My thanks to all three audiences for helpful 
questions and comments. The original impetus for this article came from a conversation I had with Henrik 
Mouritsen at a conference in Oxford in 2010, now recorded for posterity as Mouritsen 2013: 72 n.56; he 
gallantly read a draft and gave productive feedback. I also owe thanks to Catherine Steel and the anonymous 
readers for their suggestions. All faults are my own. 
1
 Spielvogel 1997 provides almost a sole voice in (partial) disagreement, though many more are quick to 
acknowledge that others who have escaped our sources may also have used his methods. Major modern works 
specifically on Clodius include Gruen 1966; Lintott 1967; Flambard 1977; Benner 1987; Tatum 1999; Cels 
Saint-Hilaire 2005; Harrison 2010. A remarkably full account of the modern historiography of Clodius to 1999 
can be found in Fezzi 1999: 249-59.  
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made direct appeal to Rome’s urban plebs as his constituency.2 The contio was not the only 
form of political activity in Rome, but it was one of the most important, and the one in which 
Clodius excelled. Contional politics was a numbers game: politicians cowed their opponents 
by demonstrating the size of the crowd they could gather.
3
 A particularly large, fervent, or 
well-deployed group could even bar opponents physically from the space of politics.
4
 Clodius 
used personal charisma to draw a crowd, and appealed to a broad base by breaking free from 
what remained of an aristocratic consensus to propose boldly populist measures.
5
 It is often 
claimed that he developed innovative methods of spreading information and mobilizing 
support.
6
 If any or all of these techniques successfully persuaded new groups to engage with 
the political process, then it is easy to see why Clodius won (for a time) the ideological and 
physical battle for control of the Forum.
7
  
                                                          
2
 So e.g. Harrison 2010: 116; Nippel 1988: 108; Lintott 1967: 159; Brunt 1966: 22. 
3
 See e.g. Cic., De imp. Cn. Pomp. 69, with Mouritsen 2001: 57; Morstein-Marx 2004: 131. 
4
 Cicero’s words on Clodius at Sest. 34 capture the implications perfectly: ‘armati homines forum et contiones 
tenebant’ (‘armed men held the forum and the contiones’). To control the physical space of the forum was to 
control the political mechanism of the contio.  
5
 That is not to say that his measures were uniformly populist: note the caveats of e.g. Tatum 1999: 114-38; 
Spielvogel 1997; Tatum 1990b on the lex de censoria notione; Tatum 1990a: 189-90 on the lex de obnuntatione; 
Gruen 1974: 255-7. 
6
 So Tan 2013; Sumi 1997: 87; Łoposzko and Kowalski 1990: 203, 208-9; Vanderbroeck 1987: 141; Lintott 
1968:193. 
7
 The question of whether he really did appeal to new audiences is beset by intractable problems of evidence. 
Almost all our evidence for 58 BCE, the year of Clodius’ tribunate, comes from the speeches delivered by 
Cicero upon his return from exile – an exile for which he blamed Clodius. Each one of these speeches is 
concerned with demonstrating that Clodius’ tribunate was nothing more and nothing less than a criminal 
conspiracy directed against Cicero in particular and the res publica in general. They are hardly dispassionate 
records, and at times show overt signs of deliberate manipulation of events, for which see especially Rundell 
1979. Spielvogel 1997: 56 has an insightful discussion of how attitudes to Cicero, either discounting or 
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In this article, I offer an evaluation of one mobilization technique which Cicero 
asserts Clodius used to gather his audience from among otherwise apolitical groups: he 
ordered the shops to be shut. Cicero makes the claim in his speech De domo sua, in the 
context of furious invective. It first appears in section 54, where Cicero is in scathingly 
sarcastic mode: ‘cum edictis tuis tabernas claudi iubebas, non vim imperitae multitudinis, sed 
hominum honestorum modestiam prudentiamque quaerebas’ (‘When you ordered in your 
edicts that the shops be shut, you were not looking for the violence of the untutored mob, but 
the moderation and restraint of respectable men’).8 The same allegation recurs at section 89: 
‘quem tu tamen populum nisi tabernis clausis frequentare non poteras’ (‘that populus which 
you cannot even gather unless you shut the shops’). In both passages, the accusation is 
presented as a weighty charge, calling into question not just Clodius’ motives and methods 
but also the legitimacy of his audience.  
 
Shutting the shops was perhaps less common than has sometimes been assumed. At 
Lucullus 2.144 (the character) Cicero describes it as a standard tactic of seditious tribunes, 
but both of his more specific references to the act in the De domo actually involve a single 
event in early 58 BCE. We know of one later occurrence: after Clodius’ death, his follower 
Munatius Plancus attempted to replicate the tactic during the trial of Milo in 52.
9
 Even so, 
Clodius’ decision to shut the shops on one particular day in 58 must have had a 
disproportionate impact, given the use Cicero makes of it as a piece of invective in the De 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
overinterpreting evidence from his pen, have affected the treatment of Clodius in modern scholarship. Leach 
2001, esp. 356-7, analyses the patterns of Cicero’s obsession with Clodius as the author of his exile. 
8
 All texts are cited from the OCT edition unless otherwise stated; all translations are my own. 
9
 Asc. 41C, 52C. As pointed out by Morstein-Marx 2004: 129, this does not justify the suggestion of Tatum 
1999: 143 that the tactic was used ‘often’. 
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domo. The logistics of the closure are unclear, though we can be sure that Clodius was within 
his rights as a tribune: Cicero paints his act as seditious and immoral, but nowhere does he 
suggest that it was illegal. But what did it achieve? 
 
Both mentions in the De domo link shutting the shops to the composition of Clodius’ 
audience. In section 54, Clodius uses it to rouse an ‘untutored mob’; in section 89, we are 
asked to believe that it was only by this expedient that Clodius could gather a crowd at all. 
The insinuation is clear: Cicero implies that shutting the shops was a last-ditch measure to 
gather an audience from workers left idle by the closure of their places of employment. In 
this article, I argue that we should not trust his interpretation. On a practical level, it seems 
unlikely that this tactic could have worked as Cicero describes it: forcing workers to lose a 
day’s wages surely antagonised at least as many potential supporters as it mobilised. Yet 
Clodius’ tactic was successful: it certainly succeeded in antagonizing Cicero. So how to 
explain the apparent paradox? Clodius did not make a political error. Rather, Cicero’s text 
deliberately distorts both what Clodius did and his motivations in doing so. If we lay aside 
the rhetorical colouring of Cicero’s text and look more clearly at the closing of the shops in 
context, it becomes clear that Clodius used this action not to force shopkeepers onto the 
streets but as a symbolic performance that signalled his intentions, galvanised his core 
audience, and allowed him to claim that he, and not Cicero, had the broad support of the 
Roman People. In the same years in which Cicero named tota Italia as his constituency, this 
was part of Clodius’ response. Whether or not the tabernarii made idle by the closures 
actually turned out to Clodius’ contio, the visual and practical impact of rows of shuttered 
tabernae told observers that this was an important meeting, and at least suggested that it was 
attended by a cross-section of society, including even members of Rome’s lowest classes.  
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Cicero on the composition of Clodius’ audience 
 
Cicero’s evaluations of Clodius’ audience cannot be taken at face value.10 His offhand 
remarks in his letters and treatises often betray no more than his own prejudices, and there is 
little trustworthy evidence in his speeches about the makeup of the crowds who heard them. 
All his writings are affected by traditional tropes of defining one’s own audience as the 
respectable populus Romanus and one’s opponent’s audience as a hired rabble of slaves.11 
What is more, a strong strand of wishful thinking pervades his words: if he tells us that a 
meeting was empty of all but hirelings (or, alternatively, stuffed full of respectable men), is 
that because it was, or because he thought it should be?
12
 
 
When Cicero mentions shutting the shops at De domo sua 89, the allegation comes in 
the context of one of his most obviously tendentious descriptions of the nature of rival 
audiences. The passage is worth quoting in full (Cic. Dom. 89-90):  
[89] an tu populum Romanum esse illum putas qui constat ex iis qui mercede 
conducuntur, qui impelluntur ut vim adferant magistratibus, ut obsideant senatum, 
optent cotidie caedem, incendia, rapinas? quem tu tamen populum nisi tabernis clausis 
frequentare non poteras, cui populo duces Lentidios, Lollios, Plaguleios, Sergios 
praefeceras. O speciem dignitatemque populi Romani, quam reges, quam nationes 
exterae, quam gentes ultimae pertimescant, multitudinem hominum ex servis, ex 
conductis, ex facinerosis, ex egentibus congregatam!  
[90] illa fuit pulchritudo populi Romani, illa forma quam in campo vidisti tum cum 
etiam tibi contra senatus totiusque Italiae auctoritatem et studium dicendi potestas 
fuit. ille populus est dominus regium, victor atque imperator omnium gentium, quem 
                                                          
10
 On Ciceronian evidence for Clodius’ audience in particular, see Cels Saint-Hilaire 2005; Favory 1979. Brunt 
1966: 23-5 remains important. 
11
 The trope and its implications are explored by Hölkeskamp 2013; Morstein-Marx 2004: 120-8; Hölkeskamp 
1995. 
12
 O’Neill 2003:136 makes a similar point with even wider application: ‘the representation of the plebs as sub-
political served as a powerful strategy in the maintenance of the political hegemony of the Roman upper 
classes.’ 
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illo clarissimo die, scelerate, vidisti tum cum omnes principes civitatis, omnes 
homines ordinum atque aetatum omnium suffragium se non de civis sed de civitatis 
salute ferre censebant, cum denique homines in campum non tabernis sed municipiis 
clausis venerant. 
 
Or do you think that the populus Romanus is composed of those who are hired for 
money, who are roused to do violence against magistrates, to besiege the Senate, to 
choose daily slaughter, fire, plunder? That populus which you cannot even gather 
unless you shut the shops, which you put under the command of leaders like 
Lentidius, Lollius, Plaguleius, Sergius? What a picture of the dignity of the populus 
Romanus, which kings, foreign nations, the furthest peoples fear: a mob of men 
gathered together from slaves, hirelings, criminals, destitutes! 
That was the beauty of the populus Romanus, that image which you saw in the 
campus on that occasion when even you were allowed to speak, against the authority 
and desire of the Senate and of all Italy. That populus is the master of kings, the victor 
and conqueror of all peoples, the one you saw on that most famous day, you criminal, 
when all the leading men of the citizenry, all men of all ordines and all ages decided 
that they were voting not on the safety of one citizen but of the city; when, to sum up, 
not the shops but entire towns were shut as men came to the vote. 
 
Here Cicero explicitly contrasts two groups, one of which prompted his exile and one of 
which rescinded it. The second is characterized with precision: the comitia of the fourth of 
August 57 BCE which passed the law recalling the orator. Time (‘tum’) and place (‘in 
campo’) are mentioned. The universality of the crowd is emphasized, but even more 
interesting is the way in which Cicero gives prominence to its internal ordering. Cicero does 
not simply repeat that everyone was present, but lists particular categories represented: 
ordines, age groups, municipia. This, then, was the true populus Romanus, a concept which 
Cicero suggests implies not just the full body of eligible citizens, but those citizens assembled 
according to an internal hierarchy and led by the principes civitatis.
13
 The first crowd, by 
contrast, is not specifically designated as the voting body which passed the lex Clodia de 
capite civis Romani or the lex Clodia de exilio Ciceronis – laws Cicero is arguing were 
                                                          
13
 Cicero’s ideal concordia or consensus, which preserves distinctions of status while uniting people across 
them, rises to the level of a slogan as ‘cum dignitate otium’ (Sest. 98). For the idea that a crowd can be judged 
on how representative it is of the various hierarchies and divisions within the populus, see also e.g. Cat. 4.16, 
4.19; Fam. 10.12.4.  
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invalid. Rather, it is the mob which regularly gathered around Clodius in early 58. Cicero 
wishes his listeners to concentrate on its violence and denies that it could ever have formed 
the legally convened populus Romanus. Its leaders are Clodius’ worthless creatures, not the 
principes civitatis. It is not representative of all levels of society, and the only principle of 
order or hierarchy represented within it is the distinctions between slaves and criminals, or 
the poor and the merely mercenary.  
 
Cicero’s description of Clodius’ crowd is pure invective, intended to disparage 
Clodius and bring the legality of his measures into question. It is hardly good evidence for the 
actual composition of the crowd of 58. Even so, there is at least one interesting detail amid 
the bombast: Clodius, Cicero claims, could only gather even such a disreputable mob by the 
expedient of shutting the tabernae – the shops, workshops, taverns and other small-scale 
commercial concerns which lined the streets in and around the Forum.
14
  
 
This passage has been variously interpreted. By telling us that Clodius gathered his 
crowd by shutting tabernae, many scholars argue, Cicero has betrayed the true nature of 
Clodius’ audience. According to their interpretation, we should deduce that his followers 
were not hired slaves, but tabernarii and opifices – shopkeepers and workmen.15 This would 
then be valuable evidence that the lower strata of Roman society did engage in political 
activity (though this passage alone cannot tell us whether they did so only for Clodius). More 
pointedly, other readers use De domo 89 to demonstrate something closer to what Cicero 
intends: Clodius was unable to gather an audience at all, and had to force workers out into the 
                                                          
14
 On the Forum tabernae see Papi 2002; Holleran 2012. 
15
 Harrison 2010: 113-14; Tan 2008: 174; Tatum 1999: 143; Sumi 1997: 90-1; Benner 1987:77; Vanderbroeck 
1987: 126-7; Flambard 1977: 124; Lintott 1967: 163. 
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Forum by closing down the tabernae, compelling them to leave their business and listen to 
him. In other words, this second line of interpretation argues that Roman craftsmen and other 
workers were not politically active unless compelled to be so.
16
  
 
Both interpretations share the assumption that shutting the shops worked because the 
workmen released from their labour in the tabernae were freed up to attend the meeting, 
whether this represented an intensification of the norm or a departure from their usual 
practice. This assumption is problematic. Forcing shops, workshops, and taverns to close was 
not, in practical terms, a tactic likely to attract a willing crowd of like-minded voters. For one 
thing, those affected by a forced closing of the tabernae were not a uniform group. The 
taberna was a ubiquitous part of the Roman commercial landscape. Although it is standard to 
translate the word ‘taberna’ as ‘shop’, we should bear in mind that it often also meant 
‘workshop’: a space of production instead of or as well as retail. Indeed, if ‘tabernarius’ just 
meant ‘someone who works in a taberna’ then it probably covered the vast majority of 
Rome’s adult male population.17 But more people than just the workers were affected if the 
tabernae were closed by decree. We must consider shopkeepers or workshop managers, 
owners as well as tenants; their employees; and of course their clients, the shoppers, as well. 
None of these would have been a homogeneous group, and we cannot assume that they all 
belonged to the lowest socio-economic strata; the shops closest to Clodius’ venue at the 
tribunal of Aurelius were the luxury-goods outlets of the Sacra Via. 
 
                                                          
16
 Mouritsen 2013: 72-3; Mouritsen 2001: 59; more agnostic but inclining towards the same interpretation are 
Morstein-Marx 2004: 129; Pina Polo 1996: 132-3. 
17
 Noted by Tatum 1999: 17-18; Purcell 1994: 659-73. 
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When the shops were shut, business owners and employees both lost money. Most 
could scarcely afford to do so: Cicero himself made this argument in 63 BCE, pointing out 
that the Catilinarians’ supposed attempts to rouse the tabernarii were doomed to failure, since 
workmen would not be willing to forfeit the day’s wage.18 Another useful piece of evidence 
comes from Sallust (Iug. 73), who imagines only a truly extraordinary event (the election of 
Marius) prompting the poor to put their political aspirations over their immediate financial 
needs. Shutting the shops would not be likely to win friends amongst those whose livelihoods 
depended on them, and shoppers too would have been inconvenienced. Finally, there was 
nothing to make those made idle by the closure actually turn out for the contio. Some might 
have relished the opportunity to become involved, or played along for the entertainment 
value, but others might have chosen to enjoy their unexpected day off elsewhere.
19
 On the 
face of it, shutting the shops would have had negative results for a politician like Clodius.  
 
Why, then, did Clodius in 58 include this technique in his political arsenal? Its 
practical effects would have been to alienate some of his natural supporters who depended on 
their day’s wage, and it could not automatically have furnished him with a captive audience. 
And why, given its apparent uselessness as a political tactic, would Cicero object to it and 
claim that it vitiated Clodius’ claim to have gathered the populus Romanus? We need another 
explanation for the importance of shutting the shops. This new explanation must go beyond 
its immediate, practical effects to the rhetorical claims Clodius was making. In the following 
sections, I explore a range of ideological overtones and historical parallels which may have 
coloured the act of shutting the shops. The final section returns to Cicero’s rhetoric at De 
domo 89-90, in which he explicitly contrasts his tota Italia with Clodius’ mob roused from 
                                                          
18
 Cat. 4.17; see further Mouritsen 2001, esp. 42-3.  
19
 Tatum 1999: 147-8 examines the various factors which might affect their decision.  
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the closed tabernae. Cicero has preserved for us in negative his opponent’s claim: the closed 
shops, which Cicero is so keen to trump with his closed towns, were Clodius’ pledges both 
that this was an occasion of great importance and that the entire populus Romanus supported 
his actions. 
 
The ideological weight of shutting the shops in Cicero 
 
De domo sua 54 also uses the charge of shutting the shops as part of an attack on 
Clodius. Again, the context is revealing: 
cum in tribunali Aurelio conscribebas palam non modo liberos sed etiam servos, ex 
omnibus vicis concitatos, vim tum videlicet non parabas; cum edictis tuis tabernas 
claudi iubebas, non vim imperitae multitudinis, sed hominum honestorum modestiam 
prudentiamque quaerebas; cum arma in aedem Castoris comportabas, nihil aliud nisi 
uti ne quid per vim agi posset machinabare; cum vero gradus Castoris convellisti ac 
removisti, tum, ut modeste tibi agere liceret, homines audacis ab eius templi aditu 
atque ascensu reppulisti; cum eos qui in conventu virorum bonorum verba de salute 
mea fecerant adesse iussisti, eorumque advocationem manibus ferro lapidibus 
discussisti, tum profecto ostendisti vim tibi maxime displicere. 
 
When you were inscribing openly at the Aurelian tribunal not only free men but even 
slaves, roused from every neighbourhood, surely then you were not preparing 
violence. When you ordered in your edicts that the shops be shut, you were not 
looking for the violence of the untutored mob, but the moderation and restraint of 
respectable men. When you were carrying arms into the temple of Castor, you were 
planning nothing other than to stop the possibility that anything could be done by 
force. Yes, when you tore up and removed the steps of Castor, then you drove off 
violent men from that temple’s entrance and staircase so that you could go about your 
business peacefully. When you asked those who spoke up about my safety in a 
meeting of good men to come forward and drove off their support with fists and steel 
and stones, then indeed you proved that violence is most displeasing to you. 
 
Here, the exact composition of the crowd is not Cicero’s main theme. Nor is he making the 
point that Clodius had trouble raising an audience and had to resort to extreme tactics. Why, 
then, does he mention how the crowd was gathered? Coming among such charges as 
enrolling slaves in his gangs and tearing down the stairs of the temple of Castor, shutting the 
shops must be a weighty allegation indeed, and even for a snob like Cicero the point is weak 
Amy Russell 4/15 
if we take it to mean only that Clodius had workmen in his audience. Cicero did not write for 
the benefit of later historians interested in decoding Clodius’ crowd mobilization techniques. 
He wanted his contemporary audience to understand something more from his reference to 
shutting the shops, and in particular it must have buttressed his overall argument in this 
section that Clodius’ meetings were so seditious as to be violent. He is trying to argue that the 
confiscation of his house is invalid, because it was passed by violence. But he cannot point to 
a specific episode of violence directly connected to the vote for confiscation, so instead he 
chooses to interpret all of Clodius’ activities as showing a general tendency to violence. It is 
under this heading that he introduces the detail about shutting shops, claiming that it 
demonstrated Clodius’ aim to gather a violent mob rather than a peaceful gathering of 
respectable citizens. 
 
In the Lucullus, Cicero treats the act of shutting the shops in more general terms. 
Towards the end of the dialogue, the character Cicero responds to a challenge from Lucullus 
with a metaphor drawn from the world of contional politics (Cic., Luc. 144):
20
 
quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in continem vocas, et quidem, ut 
seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud cum artificia 
tolli quaereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? 
 
Why do you summon me to unpopularity as if to a contio, and even, as seditious 
tribunes tend to, order the shops to be shut? For what does this aim at when you seek 
to take artificia away from us, unless it is to rouse the workmen? 
 
Cicero’s metaphor serves to set up an anaemic joke based on the multiple meanings of 
artificia – ‘skills’ or even ‘trades’ of craftsmen, but also systems of philosophical knowledge. 
Lucullus has argued that one consequence of Cicero’s sceptical epistemology is to make 
philosophical artificia impossible. Cicero jokes that Lucullus’ real aim is to persuade 
                                                          
20
 The Lucullus is the second book of the first version of the Academica, thus sometimes known as the 
Academica Priora, and sometimes, confusingly, as Academica 2. 
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craftsmen that Cicero is taking away their livelihoods. Philosophy and humour aside, his 
choice of metaphor does bring us further evidence about the composition of Roman political 
crowds. Seditious tribunes, we learn, were in the habit of (‘solent’) ordering the shops to be 
shut.
21
 ‘Seditious’ is almost a stock epithet of tribunes in Cicero, but in this case the context 
explains clearly what made the act and the tribune who commissioned it seditious. As Cicero 
characterizes it here, the technique of shutting the shops was aimed at gathering a particular 
kind of crowd, for a particular end. The result would be mob of workmen and a contio in 
which an upstanding man like him could expect only invidia.  
 
When Cicero imagined this hypothetical crowd of opifices, was it their status or their 
political attitude he objected to? Much of the time, for Cicero, the two seem to be one and the 
same: rousing the tabernarii is the action of a disreputable man with disreputable ends.
22
 In 
the Lucullus, he takes his point further: the nameless tribune in his joke is not seditious 
simply because he persuades workmen into the forum, but also because he rouses them to 
invidia by reminding them of their class interests. In the joke, the opifices are angry that 
Cicero’s epistemological manoeuvring has called into question the existence of their skills. 
The real-life parallel should be a crowd insisting on their libertas. The technique of shutting 
the shops was inherently seditious to Cicero not just because it had the power to raise a 
                                                          
21
 This may well be an exaggeration: Cicero surely only has Clodius in mind. 
22
 Dom. 13: ‘Quis est Sergius? armiger Catilinae, stipator tui corporis, signifer seditionis, concitator 
tabernariorum, damnatus iniuriarum, percussor, lapidator, fori depopulator, obsessor curiae.’ (Who is Sergius? 
He is Catiline’s soldier, your bodyguard, a standard-bearer of sedition, a rouser of the tabernarii, a man 
condemned for violence, a user of fists and stones, who empties the forum and lays siege to the Curia’). 
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crowd, but also because it drew attention to the crowd’s composition and the political 
aspirations of disadvantaged groups.
23
 
 
In this context, we should not jump to assume that shutting the shops was merely a 
last-ditch attempt to gather a crowd for an otherwise badly-attended meeting, nor can we use 
it as uncomplicated evidence that those politicians who resorted to it regularly drew their 
support from shopkeepers and other members of the lower strata of society. In the De domo, 
Cicero contrives to insinuate both, but it would be wrong to take his invective seriously. His 
rhetoric belittles, but eventually betrays, the original symbolic force of Clodius’ act. Cicero 
reads it as sedition, but we should not imagine that Clodius was in fact baying for the 
overthrow of the republic. Instead, he was taking up an effective (and in many ways entirely 
traditional) rhetorical position of his own by claiming to be the defender of the people.
24
 The 
actual composition of the crowd on the day is a separate question, and not one our evidence 
can easily answer: Clodius could make the same claim even if most of the tabernarii had in 
fact gone home. What we can deduce is that a tribune like Clodius ordered the shops to be 
shut not only to get bodies in the forum but also as a way of signalling both to his followers 
and to his opponents that he stood for, and had the support of, Rome’s lowly as a political 
class. In the following sections I test this theory against the events of 58. 
 
The events of 58 
                                                          
23
 Compare Munatius Plancus’ use of the same tactic in 52 BCE: according to Asconius he asked the people to 
shut their shops and come en masse to Milo’s trial ‘iudiciumque et dolorem suum ostenderet’ (‘in order to show 
their judgment and their anger’, 40C) and not to let Milo escape (40C, 52C). This was to be a visible 
demonstration of the popular will. 
24
 See Arena 2012: 116-68 for a full discussion of this brand of political ideology and rhetoric, an alternative to 
the one we see most often in Cicero. 
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At De domo 54, quoted in the previous section, Cicero includes the shutting of the 
shops as part of a series of events which also appear elsewhere in his speeches of the same 
period, usually in the same tone and with the same basic motifs recurring: when Clodius was 
tribune, he presided over a gathering at the tribunal of Aurelius in the Forum involving 
paramilitary enrolment of partisans into groups. In this case and in many others, Cicero goes 
on to describe the collection of armaments in the Temple of Castor and the destruction of that 
temple’s steps; some of the passages also link these events to the passing of Clodius’ laws on 
obnuntatio, the censorial notio, and the legalization of collegia.  
 
The chronology of the early days of 58 BCE is not easy to untangle, but by putting 
together the various passages we can fill in a few more details. The In Pisonem, in particular, 
includes a section in which Cicero lists the various disgraces of Piso’s consulship in 
chronological order.
25
 The first event he mentions is the illegal celebration of the ludi 
Compitalicii, which he explicitly dates to the first of January (Pis. 8). Next, he dilates on 
events which took place three days later, when Piso as consul watched measures pass which 
abrogated the Leges Aelia et Fufia, removed the censorial notio, and legalized the collegia 
(Pis. 9). Cicero’s descriptions are slanted, but easily recognisable as referring to three of the 
four laws (the fourth being the free grain dole) which Clodius had promulgated as soon as he 
entered office in December 59.
26
 They would have come up for a vote in early 58, probably 
                                                          
25
 While Cicero does not explicitly say that his structure is chronological, the passage is full of chronological 
markers: ‘in Kalendas Ianuarias’ (‘on the first of January’, 8); ‘triduo post’ (‘three days later’, 9); ‘persequere 
continentis… dies’ (‘continue to the following days’, 11). 
26
 Asconius’ commentary on the passage (8C) confirms the identification. For analysis of the four laws, see 
Tatum 1999: 117-35. 
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on the fourth of January.
27
 Keeping up his chronological structure, Cicero then asks his 
imaginary interlocutor Piso to move on to the days immediately following (‘persequere… 
continentis dies’), during which Clodius held a levy of slaves at the Aurelian tribunal and 
collected arms in the Temple of Castor. Meanwhile, Cicero stayed in his house and received 
crowds of well-wishers concerned for his safety (Pis. 11). The enrolment at the Aurelian 
tribunal and the occupation the temple of Castor are also linked at Pro Sestio 34 and In 
Pisonem 23 as well as De domo 54; in each case the enrolment is mentioned first, but there is 
no indication of a passage of time intervening between them. All three passages also mention 
the destruction of the temple’s steps.28  
 
A chronology emerges: the four laws were passed on or around the fourth of January, 
and in the days immediately following Clodius enrolled his supporters at the tribunal of 
Aurelius, seized the Temple of Castor, and destroyed its steps. All this came in early January, 
well before the lex Clodia de capite civis was officially promulgated, and certainly before 
Cicero’s departure.29 Where in the process did the shutting of the shops fall? De domo 89 
                                                          
27
 There are a few candidates for the exact date of the four votes, though 4 January is the most likely. Cicero 
explicitly says ‘three days later’ (Pis. 9), but should this mean after the first day of the games, or after they 
finished? Much also depends on the definition of the nundinae, and the question of whether there was an 
intercalary month in 58 or 59 BCE (which would affect which days were comital). See further Kaster 2006: 393-
408; Lintott 1968; Lintott 1965.  
28
 Cerutti 1998 believes that the steps destroyed were not the permanent structure to the front of the temple, but 
wooden additions connected to the pontes placed in front of the podium when it was used for voting; but see 
Mouritsen 2001: 21 n.10, who points out that all access to the temple was blocked. Again Clodius’ aim was to 
control the physical spaces of politics.  
29
 Contra Cerutti 1998: 295. Sest. 34, the only passage he cites in support of his claim that the destruction of the 
steps came after Cicero’s departure, does not offer any chronological details at all. Pis. 11 makes it clear that the 
occupation of the temple came when Cicero was still in Rome, though the steps are not mentioned. At Pis. 23 
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gives no details, but at De domo 54, the shutting of the shops is mentioned between the 
gathering at the tribunal and the occupation of the temple. The edict to shut the shops 
therefore also belongs to the same few days immediately following the fourth of January, and 
needs to be understood in that context.  
 
One of Cicero’s tactics when he presents the events of early January 58 is to insinuate 
that they constituted an armed uprising. In the In Pisonem, where his argument is that Piso 
allowed Clodius to behave in a way which was flagrantly illegal, the temple of Castor 
becomes a fortress (‘arx’, Pis. 11) and the enrolment a levy (‘dilectus’, Pis. 11, 23). In the 
Post reditum ad populum, he claims that the men were enrolled in centuries (‘centurari’, Red. 
pop. 13) again making pointed use of military vocabulary. But while Cicero is keen to imply 
that Clodius was recruiting a private army, he never goes so far as to say so directly. The 
explanation Clodius gave – as ever, filtered through Cicero’s invective – is reported in the 
Post reditum in senatu, where Cicero bemoans the fact that ‘servos simulatione conlegiorum 
nominatim esse conscriptos’ – ‘slaves were enlisted by name in a charade of collegia’ (Red. 
sen. 33). The explanation Cicero wishes to dismiss as a pretext actually makes perfect sense: 
Clodius was enlisting members to form the collegia his measure had just legalized.
30
 
 
Cicero usually describes the people being enrolled on this occasion as slaves, though 
in the longer description at De domo 54 he is willing to admit that free men were present 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Dom. 54-5, the removal of the steps is placed before Piso prohibited the Senate from wearing mourning in 
support of Cicero, which they did when Clodius proposed the lex Clodia de capite civis (Sest. 25-7, with Kaster 
2006: 395-6). 
30
 The detail at Dom. 129 that slaves were being enlisted vicatim adds further confirmation: many collegia 
would have been based in specific neighbourhoods. 
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too.
31
 On the only occasion when he describes these events in a speech to the people, on the 
other hand, there is a subtle but telling difference: in the Post reditum ad populum it is merely 
homines who are being enrolled and enlisted.
32
 Cicero’s word choice here helps to confirm 
that Clodius’ enrolment was indeed a re-registration of the collegia; their mixed membership 
of slaves and free men meant that when talking to an elite audience he can tar them with the 
odium of servile membership, but when talking to the people he must be more tactful. 
Perhaps Cicero’s careful wording in his speech to the people even suggests that Cicero was 
worried that there might be some overlap between those Clodius had registered on that day 
and those who were attending his victory speech. It is simple common sense that Clodius’ 
gathering was at least slightly more respectable than Cicero would like us to think, but here is 
a whiff of actual evidence. 
 
Both before and after Clodius’ measure, the collegia were an important part of life for 
many Romans below the level of the elite. Free, freed, and slaves all participated, and 
membership in a collegium was a valued aspect of an individual’s personal identity.33 We 
know a more about their operation in the imperial era, when they were legitimized, 
reorganized and given an important role in the imperial cult and city administration, but 
during the Republic they must have served many of the same social and religious functions. 
Before Augustus, though, they operated in a legal grey area.
34
 Indeed, they had been banned 
                                                          
31
 Pis. 23: ‘servorum dilectus’ (‘a levy of slaves’); Red. sen. 33; Dom. 129; cf. Dom. 54: ‘non modo liberos sed 
etiam servos’ (‘not only free men, but even slaves’). 
32
 Red. pop. 13: ‘cum homines in tribunali Aurelio palam conscribi centuriarique vidissem’ (‘When I saw men 
being openly inscribed and enrolled into centuries at the tribunal of Aurelius’). 
33
 In general on collegia in the Republican period, see Diosono 2007: 26-9; Flambard 1981, Treggiari 1969: 
168-77. Waltzing 1895-1900 remains fundamental, especially 1.61-113. 
34
 Full discussion inWaltzing 1895-1900: 1.78-90. 
Amy Russell 4/15 
in 64 BCE (Asc. 7C), probably because they served as focal points for political discontent 
and troublemaking which made the elite uncomfortable. Certainly, Clodius did use his revival 
of the collegia for political ends. Already in late 59 he had advertised his intention to restore 
them when he ordered that the banned ludi Compitalicii should be celebrated on the first of 
January 58; Asconius (7C) informs us that putting on these games was a task which came 
under the purview of the leaders of collegia. His success won him the allegiance of large 
numbers of voters who had a personal interest in the legalization, helping to build support for 
his later measures.  
 
Cicero may also be right that Clodius piggybacked on the collegia’s organizational 
structures to mobilize his supporters.
35
 In the days immediately following the legalization, 
Clodius made efforts to compile a list of all the reestablished groups and their membership. 
This is the process Cicero is so keen to represent as a paramilitary levy. The paramilitary 
overtones are perfect for Cicero’s arguments that Clodius’ actions were violent, but they were 
not at all out of the ordinary for collegia, whose internal organization was frequently based 
on terminology borrowed from the army.
36
 For Clodius, however, the immediate prize was 
not a private army, but a full and complete knowledge of his audience and its internal 
structures. Given the amount of effort made in today’s elections to compile lists of voters to 
target, it is obvious that such a list could be a potent political tool. 
 
In the days immediately following the passage of his four laws, Clodius’ aim was to 
consolidate the popularity they had won for him. He may even have had a deliberate plan to 
                                                          
35
 Clodius was not the first to use the collegia as political networks, of course: Cicero himself is advised to do so 
at Comment. pet. 30. 
36
 Waltzing 1895-1900: 1.357-68 collects the evidence. 
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codify and institutionalize his new support through the mechanism of the collegia. His decree 
ordering the shops to be shut was connected with a meeting at the Tribunal of Aurelius at 
which new members were signed up. He was continuing to press home the message he had 
first disseminated when he encouraged the illegal celebration of the ludi Compitalicii and had 
presumably emphasized during his contiones in the days between the bill’s promulgation and 
its ratification: the people of Rome had been unjustly deprived of their right to assemble in 
collegia, and he, Clodius, was acting as the people’s champion by restoring them. Shutting 
the shops was an advertisement that the meeting was to be one Cicero would call seditious 
and Clodius would probably call popularis, devoted to important matters vitally connected to 
the wellbeing of classes Cicero would prefer remained apolitical.  
 
Clodius’ act in shutting the shops was primarily symbolic rather than practical.37 Such 
a bold use of symbolism fits perfectly with the other events of early January 58, which 
culminated in an even more richly symbolic act: the seizure of the temple of Castor as a semi-
permanent base for Clodius’ supporters.38 This was not the act of a maniac, but a finely-tuned 
piece of political bravado. It allowed him to claim the gods’ favour (a trope Cicero inverts, 
accusing Clodius of blaspheming the temple) and also gave him physical control over one of 
the main locations used for public speech and voting. The occupied temple provided a 
permanent reminder of Clodius’ strength, confronting the Curia diagonally across the Forum. 
The Curia may have watched over and guarded the Rostra – a metaphor Cicero uses for his 
desired state of affairs, in which the Senate’s authority guided the progression of popular 
                                                          
37
 Sumi 2005: passim, but esp. 11 analyses the operation of different levels of symbolism within Republican 
political activity, with close attention to how politicians’ ritual performances and their audiences’ knowledge 
and expectations combined to create meaning. 
38
 Tatum 1999: 143-4 notes that the temple was selected as a prominent rallying-point; Cerutti 1998 has little to 
say about the implications one way or another. On the religious aspect, see Lennon 2010: 182-4. 
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assemblies – but Clodius’ headquarters now watched over and guarded the Forum’s other 
speaking platform, which was the podium of the temple of Castor itself.
39
 
 
The iustitium 
 
It remains to be explained how and why the act of shutting the shops had developed 
such a powerful symbolic impact. P. J. Vanderbroeck has argued that Clodius shut the shops 
as ‘a sign of major distress’ and ‘an indication that something important was about to 
happen’; for him, this was because shutting the shops was part of a iustitium, an emergency 
stoppage of business decreed by Clodius.
40
 Unfortunately, it is not clear that this was an 
official iustitium: no source calls it by that name, and Clodius probably did not have the 
power to declare one. Still, the institution of the iustitium deserves attention: for Livy, and so 
perhaps also for Cicero and Clodius a generation earlier, shutting the shops was one of the 
key features of the iustitium. What is more, in all of Roman history shutting the shops only 
appears in our evidence in these two contexts: the acts of Clodius and his followers, and the 
iustitium. Further analysis of the institution and its fate in the late Republic can help us 
untangle the context in which Clodius acted.  
 
The iustitium is best known to us from Livy, where it appears as an extraordinary 
measure taken during the early and middle republic when the city itself was under military 
threat. Livy records a number of iustitia, and explicitly points out the shutting of the shops in 
three cases: in 458 BCE when the Samnites were at the gates, in 426 BCE when an attack 
                                                          
39
 Flacc. 57: ‘speculatur atque obsidet rostra vindex temeritatis et moderatrix offici curia’ (‘the Curia, punisher 
of indiscretion and guide of duty, watches over and guards the Rostra’). 
40
 Vanderbroeck 1987: 127; cf. Benner 1987: 115, though Vanderbroeck is more alert to the symbolic 
significance. 
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from Veii and Fidenae threatened, and in 321 BCE after the disaster at the Caudine Forks.
41
 
The first of these will serve as an example (Livy 3.27.2-4): 
cum magistro equitum in contionem venit, iustitium edicit, claudi tabernas tota urbe 
iubet, vetat quemquam privatae quicquam rei agere; tum quicumque aetate militari 
essent armati cum cibariis in dies quinque coctis vallisque duodenis ante solis 
occasum Martio in campo adessent; quibus aetas ad militandum gravior esset, vicino 
militi, dum is arma pararet vallumque peteret, cibaria coquere iussit.  
 
He [the dictator Cincinnatus] came to the contio with the magister equitum, decreed a 
iustitium, ordered the shops in the whole city to be shut, and forbade anyone to carry 
out any private business; then he ordered anyone of military age to be on the Campus 
Martius before sunset, armed and with five days’ food and twelve stakes; and those 
who were too old to fight he ordered to cook food for their neighbours who were 
soldiers while they were preparing their arms and finding stakes. 
 
Livy’s iustitia follow a regular pattern, giving a clear picture of the early operation of this 
institution as his generation understood it. The iustitium was declared by edict of a consul or 
dictator, usually on the orders of the Senate, and later halted by another edict of the same 
magistrate. While it was in force, all public business halted so that all efforts could be 
directed to defence. The treasury was sealed, the courts did not operate, and the shops were 
shut; only the levy continued.  
 
In Livy’s reports of these early iustitia, the element of direct danger to the city itself is 
always present.
42
 Shutting the shops is a result of a state of emergency in which the city is 
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 Livy 3.27.2 (the Samnites in 458); 4.32.1 (the Veientines and Fidenates in 426); 9.7.8 (the Caudine Forks). 
Other iustitia in Livy are at 3.3.6; 4.26.11-12; 6.7.1; 7.9.6; 10.4.2. 
42
 It might be possible to cite the iustitium after the battle of the Caudine Forks as an exception. Here the people 
spontaneously shut the shops before a iustitium is officially declared, because of the depth of public mourning 
following the disaster: ‘tabernae circa forum clausae iustitiumque in foro sua sponte coeptam primus quam 
indictum’ (‘The shops around the forum were closed and a iustitium began spontaneously in the forum before it 
could be decreed’, Livy 9.7.8). We might see here an early precursor of the imperial use of the iustitium as a 
mourning period, for which see Garofalo 2009; Fraschetti 1988; Weinstock 1966; more likely, though, is that 
the people’s decision to turn to the forms of a iustitium had as much to do with fear as grief. They had every 
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placed on military alert. The full gravity of the military implications are expressed most 
clearly at 4.31.9: ‘in muris armati dispositi, et iustitium in foro tabernaeque clausae, fiuntque 
omnia castris quam urbi similiora’ – ‘armed men were placed on the walls, in the forum a 
iustitium was declared and the shops were shut. Everything came to resemble a camp more 
than a city’.  
 
The Livian episodes are hundreds of years earlier than the period under discussion, 
but there is evidence that the iustitium was a regular part of political discourse in Clodius’ 
time. Cicero does not use the word iustitium in any of the passages analysed above. 
Elsewhere, however, without reference to an identifiable occasion, he does accuse Clodius of 
calling for the declaration of a iustitium (Cic., Har. resp 55): 
monent enim eidem ne occultis consiliis res publica laedatur. quae sunt occultiora 
quam eius qui in contione ausus est dicere iustitium edici oportere, iuris dictionem 
intermitti, claudi aerarium, iudicia tolli?  
 
They warn, ‘do not let the res publica be harmed by secretive plans’. What are more 
secretive than the plans of that man who dared to say in a contio that a iustitium 
should be declared, that the giving of verdicts should be halted, that the treasury 
should be closed, that trials should be ended? 
 
Cicero’s use of the word iustitium shows that he, Clodius, and his audience were all familiar 
with the institution. He is grasping at straws here in an attempt to make the haruspices’ 
pronouncements reflect badly on his enemy, but although his words are tendentious they bear 
witness to the fact that Cicero at least tried to portray the iustitium as itself inherently 
dangerous to the res publica (that is, to Cicero and his supporters). Cicero was not above 
calling for a iustitium himself: many years later at Philippic 5.31 he includes it as part of a 
hyperbolic list of measures which must be taken against Antonius. His entire speech was 
aimed at convincing his audience that Antonius presented a real military threat, and he was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reason to suspect that the victorious Sabine army would immediately march on Rome, and there was an 
immediate need for new levies to defend the city. 
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trying to persuade the senators to take whatever measures they could to show the people the 
seriousness of the situation. The declaration of a iustitium would be a strong sign that the city 
itself was in danger. Even if he knew that there was no hope a iustitium would actually be 
declared in the circumstances, his mention of the institution gave his argument extra 
rhetorical weight.
43
  
 
The word iustitium is not otherwise used in our extant sources in connection with 
Clodius or any similar figure of the Late Republic. This has not stopped scholars from finding 
iustitia in other known pauses in public business, which became more and more frequent in 
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 There are two other occasions during the late republican period for which our sources use the exact word 
iustitium. The second of the two, at Gran. Licin. 33 Criniti, can be disposed of fairly quickly. Granius (writing 
under Hadrian) claims that a iustitium followed the death of Sulla, and the matronae mourned him for an entire 
year. Granius may be drawing on a lost passage of Sallust or Livy here, but I think it is more likely that he has 
over-interpreted a description he found in one of those authors of Sulla’s public funeral. The institution he has in 
mind here is one of the imperial period, when a iustitium was declared to mark a period of public mourning 
following a prominent death in the imperial house. The development of the institution is interesting in itself (see 
the previous note for references), but for Sulla it is anachronistic. The second is more puzzling. At Planc. 33, as 
part of a list praising the Roman tolerance for free speech, Cicero reports an anecdote in which a praeco named 
Granius gets a laugh at the expense of the consul named as P. Nasica during a iustitium; the joke depends on the 
fact that both public auctions and embassies have been halted. P. Nasica is probably the consul of 111 BCE; 
those few scholars who have noted this passage have tended to assume that a iustitium in his consulship might 
have been in response to the crisis in Africa. If so, the element of direct threat to the city is missing. As pointed 
out by Scalia 1999, we might also expect Sallust to mention the iustitium if there were a Jugurthine connection. 
Perhaps more likely is his suggestion that the iustitium was proclaimed in response to the defeat of Gnaeus 
Papirius Carbo by the Cimbri and Teutones at Noreia in 112; there was an ongoing fear that these migrating 
tribes would turn to Italy, though even this is a stretch. I am inclined to believe that Cicero is using the term 
loosely here, and that some other form of stoppage of public business was in effect, though the episode as a 
whole remains an enigma. 
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the Republic’s final century. Whether they were technically iustitia or not, the other 
stoppages also contributed to the political discourse of Clodius’ time, and shed light on his 
decision to shut the shops.  
 
In the Late Republic, obstructionary tactics were a standard part of politics. Tribunes 
could and regularly did veto or threaten to veto any business whatsoever unless their pet 
project was approved – a tactic used by Curio to paralyse the city in 50 BCE, for example.44 
The Senate could do the same, as they did in the very next year after Clodius’ tribunate, when 
(as Cicero tells it) they refused to transact any business until Cicero’s return was settled (Cic., 
Red. sen. 6). Consuls had their own methods, from Sulla’s declaration that most of the year 
88 BCE was feriae (religiously unsuitable for the passage of laws) to Bibulus’ obnuntatio in 
59 BCE (watching for adverse omens to vitiate any political action), the exact tactic Clodius’ 
lex de obnuntatione a year later sought to prevent.
45
 All of these blocking tactics had their 
own legal, practical, and symbolic effects. Though Roman politicians did not always play by 
the rules, they knew perfectly well what the rules were, and could play on the symbolic 
differences between one kind of stoppage and another even if they did not have the legal 
powers to effect either.
46
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 Cic., Att. 6.2.6; Caelius ap. Cic., Fam. 8.13.2, 8.11.2-3; for discussion, see de Libero 1992: 26-7. Earlier 
comparanda (discussed at Bernstein 1978: 171 in connection with Tiberius Gracchus’ actions) include the 
events of 184 BCE, when two camps of tribunes each held the threat of veto over the other (Livy 39.38.10), and 
the threat of a tribune of 148 BCE to veto the elections if Scipio was not a candidate (App., Pun. 112).  
45
 Sulla: App., BC 1.55; Plut., Vit. Sull. 8.2-3. Biblulus: Cic., Har. resp. 48; Plut., Vit. Caes. 14.9; Dio Cass. 
38.6. 
46
 There is a thick vein of scholarship on these strategies of obstruction that takes a legalistic approach, 
distinguishing between various different legal powers to halt public business. Some are maximalist, claiming all 
of these examples and more as iustitia; others engage in fine-grained distinctions between different legal and 
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One episode in particular has prompted even more scholarly debate than any of the 
others, and it is the one most relevant to the present investigation: a decree of Tiberius 
Gracchus. In 133 BCE, as part of the struggles surrounding the passage of his agrarian bill, 
Tiberius Gracchus declared a stoppage of public business and threatened that he would only 
lift it if his bill was allowed to come to a vote. The only surviving sources are Greek, so we 
have no idea what word was used to describe his tactic in Latin. Plutarch (Vit. Ti. Gracch. 
10.5-6) writes that Gracchus had issued a decree preventing the other magistrates from doing 
business. He also specifically mentions that Gracchus sealed the treasury and promised 
penalties for those who contravened his edict. Appian has no mention of the stoppage, though 
it should be noted that there is a lacuna at BC 1.12, at precisely this point in the narrative; the 
question is whether we wish to speculate that the entire episode has fallen out. In Cassius 
Dio’s version ([24].83.4-6), public business stops, but the pause is attributed not to a 
tribunician decree but to the violence between Tiberius and Octavius’ supporters. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
religious procedures and confine the use of the word iustitium to a few very specific cases. So, for example, I 
have referred to Sulla’s tactic in 88 as the declaration of feriae, with Levick 1982: 82; Keaveney 1982: 60; 
Lintott 1971: 518; Niccolini 1934: 518. Others, such as Mitchell 1975 and Gabba 1958: 163-4 see a iustitium 
here. The problem is, of course, that the relevant texts are Greek. Both Appian and Plutarch cover the events, 
but they use two different words: ἀργίαι in Appian (BC 1.55) and ἀπραξίαι in Plutarch (Vit. Sull. 8.3). 
Ἀπραξίαι is vague and could refer to any kind of stoppage, but Appian is more precise, telling us that he is 
using the word ἀργίαι to refer to a religiously-based suspension of business of the kind which accompanies a 
major festival. Lacey 1961 would see Curio’s actions in 50 as a iustitium. Benner 1987 is particularly free with 
the word, finding iustitia in the disruptions of Milo’s attempts to try Clodius in 57 (94) and Clodius’ obstruction 
surrounding his own prosecution of Milo in 56 (126). For a taxonomy of a range of obstructive tactics, see de 
Libero 1992. 
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I see no reason not to accept Plutarch’s notice that Tiberius Gracchus published a 
decree.
47
 In the end, no matter how it was worded, its legal power must have rested on 
tribunician sacrosanctity as expressed in the veto. We are not told that he shut the shops.
48
 He 
did stop all public business, and two other details are given: he shut the treasury, and people 
changed into mourning garb. These are both procedures Cicero connects to the institution of 
the iustitium in the Late Republic.
49
 Even more interesting, however, is Dio’s interpretation 
of the same events. In Dio ([24].83.4-6) no decree of Tiberius is reported; instead, the 
historian indulges in some allusion to Thucydides on the perils of civil strife, but mixed in 
with a description strongly reminiscent of Livy’s early Republican iustitia. Dio’s closing 
flourish, καὶ ὄνομα πόλεως ἔφερον, στρατοπέδου δὲ οὐδεν ἀπεῖχον – ‘it was called a 
city, but it was nothing short of a camp’ – irresistibly recalls Livy’s ‘fiuntque omnia castris 
quam urbi similiora’ – ‘everything began to resemble a camp more than a city’, in his 
description of the iustitium of 426 BCE (4.31.9).
50
  
 
Since Mommsen, scholars have argued over whether Tiberius declared a iustitium or 
not. Arguments range from the legal – in Livy, only magistrates with imperium are found 
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 See Bonenfant 1969 for a defence of Plutarch’s version. 
48
 Perhaps he did and Plutarch failed to mention it. 
49
 Sealing the treasury: Har. resp. 55; mourning garb: Phil. 5.31. 
50
 Compare also App., BC 5.18, where the people react spontaneously to the military occupation of the city in 41 
BCE by shutting their shops, driving out the magistrates, and refusing to allow the courts to operate. Bonenfant 
1969: 119-20, who has one of the best treatments of the episode as a whole, notices the similarity between Dio 
and Livy. He goes too far, however, when arguing that this must reflect Dio’s Latin source which will have used 
the word iustitium. The Latin source could have been engaged in the same play of allusion without implying that 
this stoppage was technically a iustitium.  
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declaring iustitia, and it seems unlikely that tribunes had the power to do so – to the 
pragmatic, which Carcopino used to argue that the entire episode is a fiction: if tribunes did 
have such a power, why did the Gracchi and indeed those who came after them not make 
better use of this powerful weapon?
51
 Many more recent scholars take a compromise 
position: although Tiberius probably did not have the legal right to pronounce a iustitium, he 
used his tribunician powers to achieve one in all but name.
52
 The overwhelming power of (the 
threat of) the veto meant he had no need of a iustitium to achieve the same kind of gridlock. 
All securely identified iustitia were indeed declared by magistrates with imperium, and those 
seeking a compromise seem to be on the right track. None of them, however, have yet 
satisfactorily answered Carcopino’s pragmatic objection, that a weapon so powerful could not 
have been taken up and then abandoned: if this is true of a legally-defined iustitium, it should 
also be true of a technique which was in practice equivalent to a iustitium.
53
 As the present 
investigation reveals, however, when we look beyond legalities it becomes clear that 
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 Mommsen 1877:1.261-3 thought that Tiberius Gracchus did declare a iustitium, and it had an important effect 
on his conceptualization of the institution. He is followed by Gabba 1958: 34-5; Boren 1968: 57; Benner 1987: 
94. Carcopino 1928: 16-23, though, entirely dismissed the notion of a iustitium, claiming that the entire event is 
a fabrication of late and corrupt sources and that Tiberius never closed the treasury or stopped the courts. As 
well as his pragmatic objection, Carcopino also doubted that a iustitium could be declared in the absence of an 
external threat, which as we have seen was present in all the Livian examples. Many recent commentators 
maintain strongly that a tribune had no power to declare a iustitium. Thomsen 1944 chooses to solve the 
problem with the extraordinary explanation that there was a iustitium, but it was in fact the consul Calpurnius 
Piso Frugi who decreed it, thus revealing himself as a secret Gracchan sympathizer.  
52
 So Lintott 1999: 125; Stockton 1979: 65; Bernstein 1978: 171 n.75; Richardson 1976: 210 n.6; Astin 1967: 
204-5, 346-7; Earl 1963 80-2; Niccolini 1934: 111-12. Fuller discussions can be found in Scalia 1999; Pinna 
Parpaglio 1988. 
53
 It is worth mentioning (with Bonenfant 1969: 114 n.4) that those who concede the point to Carcopino in a 
footnote forget that he did not object merely to the word iustitium, but to the entire sequence of events. 
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Gracchus’ actions did indeed set a precedent which at least one other, namely Clodius, 
followed. 
 
Tiberius Gracchus probably did not have the power to declare a iustitium. 
Nevertheless, our sources see his actions through the lens of a iustitium, even assimilating it 
to early Republican examples. Whatever happened in 133 BCE, it not only duplicated the 
practical effects of a iustitium, but also the symbolic effects. Normal business was suspended 
because of a single incipient threat; as Dio tells us, the result was tantamount to a city at war. 
A quick reading might suggest that Gracchus was merely threatening to inconvenience the 
political class to make sure his law was passed, but that is to misinterpret Plutarch. In 
Plutarch, he says he will lift the decree once his bill comes to a vote, with no rider about 
which way the vote should go. Gracchus was aiming to influence Octavius into withdrawing 
his opposition by using the symbolic power of the iustitium. His decree, though not 
technically a iustitium, approximated one. By making an allusion to that venerable institution, 
Gracchus emphasized the peril in which the res publica found itself and assimilated his 
opponents to an invading army.  
 
Clodius and the symbolic power of the iustitium 
 
I cannot agree with Vanderbroeck that Clodius actually declared a iustitium in 58 
BCE. Yet when Clodius used the word iustitium in a contio he drew on both its early 
Republican and its more recent history.
54
 When he ordered the shops to be shut, the one 
feature which at least in Livy is closely tied to the iustitium and to no other form of 
suspension of business, he was alluding to this institution of the iustitium without actually 
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declaring one.
55
 More than that, he was alluding to the use of a similar tactic by one of his 
patron saints, Tiberius Gracchus.  
 
Clodius was no stranger to the symbolic power of traditional forms.
56
 His temple of 
Libertas among the ruins of Cicero’s house drew on a rich vein of religious symbolism 
directly linked with political ideology, and upon Cicero’s return he used allusion to the 
formulae of both evocatio and the so-called Senatus Consultum Ultimum to call the people to 
its defence.
57
 Even the spelling of his name – the ‘popular’ form ‘Clodius’ rather than the 
‘patrician’ Claudius – utilized broadly understood patterns of meaning to pointed effect.58 It 
would be easy to multiply these examples further. Wilfried Nippel has used a similar 
approach to interpret Clodius’ acts of violence: rather than painting Clodius as an 
unreasoning terrorist or calculating psychopath, willing to use all means including violence to 
achieve his ends, Nippel sees him as deliberately enacting the procedures of archaic folk-
justice traditions.
59
 The destruction of Cicero’s house is a perfect example; Clodius 
revitalized the (probably invented) tradition that a tyrant’s house was forfeit and should be 
torn down.
60
 In the episode of the house we can see the tribune working with a complex 
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 Contra Benner 1987: 115; Vanderbroeck 1987: 127. Vanderbroeck in particular is alive to the symbolic 
implications of the iustitium, but is wrong about the legal status of Clodius’ act, which he thinks was a literal 
iustitium, and about its practical effects, which he connects closely with the mobilization of a plebs contionalis 
consisting of patronless freedmen who worked in the tabernae.  
56
 Vanderbroeck 1987: 116-20 has a general treatment; see also Sumi 1997, on the symbolic aspects of Clodius’ 
funeral. Riggsby 2002: 123 says of Augustus, set up as a comparandum to Clodius, that his ‘practical reforms 
were embedded in a larger symbolic package’. 
57
 In general on the temple, see Arena 2012: 212-14; for the formulae used in its defence, Nippel 1988: 122. 
58
 Disucssion in Riggsby 2002. 
59
 Nippel 1988: 108-28; see also Lintott 1967: 167-8; Lintott 1968: 7-10.  
60
 Nippel 1988: 116-17. 
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symbolic repertoire which presents a fascinating counterpoint to the usual picture we get 
from Cicero’s writings, and those of later sources who follow him. In Cicero and Livy, the 
houses of the so-called affectatores regni are torn down because they were proto-populares, 
and their function as exempla is to justify the actions of those like Scipio Nasica, Opimius, or 
Cicero himself who saw themselves as standing against the Gracchi and Catiline just as 
Servilius Ahala had stood against Spurius Maelius, or Cincinnatus against Manlius 
Capitolinus.
61
 Clodius proposed a different reading of the same exemplary episodes. For his 
audience, the communal effort of house destruction was the perfect statement of the will of 
the Roman people not to have any individual lord it over them. Clodius was capable of 
looking to the distant past (especially as filtered through the age of the Gracchi) for 
inspiration.
62
 Most importantly, he expected his audience to understand and participate in the 
symbolic rituals he choreographed.
63
 
 
Legalistic breakdowns of Roman institutions are only valuable to a certain point. 
Roman politicians were old hands at manipulating them, and the list of legal obstructionary 
tactics I alluded to earlier furnishes plenty of examples: all on perfectly legal grounds, none 
adhering to the spirit in which those institutions were originally devised. But the point of the 
iustitium for Clodius (and indeed for Gracchus) was not the legal backing it might be able to 
give him for his actions, since he had the legal power to achieve all the same ends through the 
veto. Rather, it was the ideological weight of the iustitium that interested him. So here we 
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 e.g. Cic., Cat. 1.3; Mil. 8.; Livy 2.41 (Sp. Cassius), 4.13-16 (Sp. Maelius), 6.14-20 (Manlius Capitolinus). 
Roller 2010 has a full exploration of the trope. 
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 Remember that the collegia themselves were believed to go back to Numa: Plut., Vit. Num. 17; Plin., HN 34.1, 
35.159. 
63
 See Morstein-Marx 2004: 68-118 for a detailed exploration of the (high) level of historical knowledge 
possessed by the audience of contiones. 
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move from legalistic territory to the realm of ‘political culture’: not what the institutions are, 
but how they are understood and the unwritten rules surrounding their use.
64
 Both abiding by 
these rules and deliberately transgressing them were useful tools for a Roman politician.
65
 
The complex of symbolism and unwritten norms surrounding Roman political activity could 
be put to Clodius’ ends just as easily as it could to upholding senatorial consensus. 
 
The shutting of the shops played an important role in the symbolic structure Clodius 
was building in early 58 BCE. It reproduced the conditions of the early iustitia as they were 
understood in the late Republic, and thus revived the Gracchan connotations the iustitium had 
accrued. Clodius was claiming a role as the defender of Rome, and casting his opponents as 
an imminent threat to the city’s very survival; he raised the problems he faced to the level of 
a foreign invasion. The iustitium even allowed him to suggest that paramilitary enlistment 
and even violence were an appropriate response to the situation. Finally, he created an 
ideological link between himself and Tiberius Gracchus, still beloved by the Roman people 
and his relative by marriage. It was this ideological and symbolic baggage that Cicero meant 
when he said that shutting the shops was the act of a seditious tribune, and it was this layered 
ideological appeal, rather than the fact of physically forcing people from their workplaces, 
that enabled Clodius to draw an audience by shutting the shops. What was at stake was not 
the legal authority required to shut the shops, or the pragmatics of rousing apathetic 
tabernarii to the meeting, but a symbolic repertoire drawn from early Roman history similar 
to the one we see Cicero himself turn to again and again. 
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 Hölkeskamp 2010 passim argues for the primary importance of political culture as a way of understanding the 
Roman Republic. 
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 On the value of both conforming to and transgressing norms, see especially David 1993 on the tribunate, and 
Hölscher 2004 more generally. 
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Shutting the shops and the rhetoric of audience composition 
 
A detailed treatment of the iustitium has allowed me to propose some reasons which 
may have lain behind the evident symbolic success of Clodius’ move. His decree that the 
shops should be shut would have had drastic effects on the economic wellbeing of plenty of 
men who might or might not previously have supported him. He certainly could not 
guarantee that those who could not go about their usual business that day would instead turn 
out to his meeting. But he was willing to suffer those negative consequences because the act 
of shutting the shops was intimately connected the powerful tradition of the iustitium, and the 
still-vibrant memory of Tiberius Gracchus. It sent a powerful signal to his potential audience 
that the Republic was in danger and needed their aid.  
 
Does this mean that the act of shutting the shops has no bearing on the question of 
whether Clodius actually managed to involve new constituencies in Roman political activity? 
If shutting the shops was primarily a symbolic move rather than a practical one, we cannot 
use Clodius’ adoption of the tactic as transparent evidence that his followers were opifices 
and tabernarii. Yet to concentrate too single-mindedly on historical allusion risks missing 
some even more prominent symbolic effects of Clodius’ actions. When the shops were shut, 
everyone would know about it, from the tabernarii themselves to the highest elite. They 
might find themselves personally inconvenienced, unable to pick up their dinner or get their 
sandals mended; even if they had no shopping to do that day, the visual impact of rows of 
shutters during what would normally be a busy day could not be ignored. Clodius did not 
have to enrol large numbers of actual tabernarii or opifices among his followers to be able to 
claim their support, or even to make the broader and more revolutionary claim that he (and 
possibly he alone) could mobilise this new political constituency. The man most obviously 
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discomfited by his tactic was none other than Cicero: perhaps we should see him and those 
like him as its primary intended audience. 
 
In general, Cicero’s characterizations of his opponent’s following are to be discarded, 
and I have argued above that his description of the men being enrolled as ‘homines’ in his 
only speech to the people on the topic is a telling sign that they were not in fact mainly 
servile. But Cicero is not only interested in the composition of Clodius’ crowd as a simple 
piece of invective. As comes out most clearly at De domo 89-90, the entire struggle between 
the two men is framed around a debate about the true wishes of the true populus Romanus. 
For Cicero, his own crowd represents his longed-for ‘consensus omnium bonorum’, his ‘tota 
Italia’.66 It is a standing point in his post-exile rhetoric that the crowd which called him back 
was far larger than the mob which exiled him, composed of men of all classes from all over 
Italy. The last clause of De domo 90 proposes an explicit comparison between Clodius’ 
crowd of reprobates, who shut their shops, and Cicero’s, who left entire towns closed on the 
day they came to vote for his recall.  
 
Cicero’s comparison has unwittingly preserved for us in negative form Clodius’ own 
rhetorical tactic. The fact that the shops were closed advertised the vital importance of 
Clodius’ meeting and the magnitude of the threat the republic faced. It also advertised the 
composition of his audience. Whether or not workers from tabernae actually showed up to 
his meeting, the closed shops would have let him make the claim that they did. He could use 
the visual impact of shuttered storefronts to argue that all levels of Roman society, even the 
lowliest, were represented in his crowd. This, he could declare, was the true populus 
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 On the rhetorical weight Cicero places on the universus populus, see Bell 1997, especially 17-18; on tota 
Italia, Dench 2013: 128. 
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Romanus. For his own claim to have brought new groups into the political process, Cicero 
looked to the worthy burghers of Italy; Clodius kept his sights on Rome but argued that he 
had extended political participation further down the social scale than ever before.
 67
 Their 
disagreement was fundamental and ideological: whose opinions should really count? 
 
There are good reasons to suppose that Rome’s normal political audience was limited 
to a leisured elite.
68
 Even so, the contemporary textual evidence of Cicero suggests that 
workmen, shopkeepers, the poor, freedmen, and even foreigners and slaves attended 
contiones at least occasionally.
69
 His ‘exercitus hominum… locupletium’ – ‘army of well-off 
men’ – was only one part of the politically-active citizenry.70 The rest he felt free to dismiss 
in a letter as ‘illa contionalis hirudo aerari, misera ac ieiuna plebecula’ – ‘that leech on the 
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 Cf. Dench 2005: 182, ‘Cicero’s version of an expanded body of political agents is distinctly horizontal rather 
than vertical.’ 
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 Major contributions to this ongoing debate include Mouritsen 2013; Jehne 2006; Mouritsen 2001; Laser 1997; 
Vanderbroeck 1987. The majority of contiones were held in the Forum Romanum, where the limited space 
available meant only a tiny proportion of the population could ever have participated. Potential members of the 
crowd had to be able to travel to the city, ruling out most rural dwellers; in the normal order of things only the 
richer members of society would be able to sacrifice a day’s work to attend a political meeting. We might also 
ask whether the poor had any interest in participating, even when they were able. Many of the issues discussed 
did not affect them directly, and there was no mass media to inform them of when and on what topic a meeting 
would take place, though see O’Neill 2003; Flower 2013 on the circulation of information, perhaps via routes 
invisible to our usual sources. 
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 e.g. Cic., Cat. 4.16: ‘omnis ingenuorum adest multitudo, etiam tenuissimorum’ (‘the whole multitude of 
respectable men is here, even the poorest’). Foreigners (or at least foreign-born freedmen) are implied by ‘turba 
et barbaria forensis’ at De or. 1.118 and claimed explicitly at Flacc. 17; slaves are most often mentioned in 
connection with Clodius, as at Dom. 89.  
70
 Att. 1.19.4: ‘Is enim est noster exercitus, hominum, ut tute scis, locupletium’ (‘For this is my army, as you 
know, of well-off men’) – contrasted in the next phrase with ‘populo autem’ (‘the people, on the other hand…’).  
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treasury, the wretched, starving rabble who turn up to meetings’ (Att. 1.19.4). Yet he was 
aware that their support was at least potentially important, and kept track of their views and 
enthusiasms alongside those of the boni.
71
  
 
In the De domo, Cicero argues that every respectable citizen, even the poorest, is on 
his side; left for Clodius are only the criminals and the totally destitute. Again, we can see 
Clodius’ rhetoric in negative preserved within Cicero’s attacks. Cicero wants his audience to 
understand this passage as a stark contrast with the pitiful and disreputable crowd conjured up 
by his own description of Clodius’ following. In its original context, though, the real contrast 
must have been with Clodius’ competing claims that his own crowd truly represented the full 
cross-section of Roman society. Both men start from the same assumption, that the will of the 
populus Romanus must prevail; they only differ in where they find it. 
 
 My reconstruction of Clodius’ rhetoric has two important consequences. Firstly, the 
question about whether Clodius involved new groups in the political process is not merely a 
modern obsession. Clodius did make such a claim, but even in his own time the truth of his 
claim was under attack. Cicero sometimes wants to emphasise that Clodius’ crowds included 
tabernariis and opifices as part of an attack on their moral standing, but at other times his 
rhetoric points to a wider conflict about who truly has the support of Rome’s free poor. 
Secondly, it is possible that Cicero’s persuasive refutation of Clodius’ claims has distorted 
our understanding of Clodius’ relationship with Rome’s citizenry more broadly. If I am 
correct that Clodius wanted to portray the entire populus Romanus – except, perhaps, for an 
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out-of-touch and intransigent senatorial elite – as standing with him, then we must reconsider 
how far up the social scale, as well as down, Clodius’ support went. 
 
At De domo 89, Cicero tries to reduce Clodius’ tactic to a practical measure to get 
people on the streets. This is an orator’s sleight of hand. Cicero’s rhetorical move picks up on 
the ‘popular’ connotations of shutting the shops, but diminishes its impact by reducing it to a 
desperate attempt to fill out the crowd. We should not follow his interpretation. When late 
Republican politicians decreed that the shops should be shut, they were not only trying to 
gather warm bodies for a contio by forcing tabernarii onto the street, but making a symbolic 
display claiming that their meeting was both vital to the safety of the res publica and had 
broad public support. A fuller understanding of this political tactic not only helps us make 
sense of Clodius’ actions and his sources of support but also acts as corrective against the 
one-sided Ciceronian view of the conventions of Roman politics, in which tradition and 
symbolic weight are entirely on his side. 
 
Shutting the shops worked as a rhetorical tactic for Clodius. Using the forms of the 
iustitium, Clodius positioned himself as the leader of the true populus Romanus, and his 
opponents as enemies, even invaders. The Gracchan connection added another powerful 
ideological twist. What is more, the visual and practical impact of closed shops not only 
marked out this occasion as special, but gave the impression that people across the spectrum 
of Roman society had downed tools to support him – even if that was not in fact the case. 
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